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The International Consequences of the 1979 U.S.
Monetary Policy Switch: The Case of Switzerland
Georg Rich
ACHIEVING PRICE STABILITY 
IN THE FACE OF A WEAK U.S.
DOLLAR
In the second half of the 1960s, Swiss inflation
began to accelerate in line with the worldwide
surge in prices. Despite a strong desire to stabilize
prices, the SNB was powerless in curbing inflation
as long as Switzerland insisted on maintaining a
fixed exchange rate. Furthermore, as the postwar
system of fixed exchange rates began to collapse,
Switzerland faced massive inflows of speculative
capital triggered by expectations about a sub-
stantial revaluation of the Swiss franc and other
European currencies against the U.S. dollar. Since
the SNB could sterilize at best a small portion of
the attendant increase in its foreign exchange
reserve, the capital inflows led to an excessive
expansion in the money supply, adding fuel to the
already serious inflation problem. Notably in 1971,
the Swiss monetary base expanded enormously.1
Not surprisingly, the year-on-year inflation rate,
measured in terms of consumer prices, shot up
to a peak of 11.9 percent in December 1973. The
Swiss public regarded this development as a major
calamity. In the past, persistently high inflation
had never arisen during peace-time. 
A realignment of exchange rates in 1971 pro-
vided only temporary relief to Swiss authorities.
Another incipient speculative assault at the
beginning of 1973 forced the authorities to float
the exchange rate of the Swiss franc. As a result,
the SNB acquired the ability to combat inflation
through a tight monetary policy. Under the
INTRODUCTION
W
hen the news of a fundamental
change in U.S. monetary policy hit
the Swiss National Bank (SNB) in
October 1979, its key officials welcomed the
Fed’s decision with noticeable sighs of relief.
The SNB was pleased about the U.S. policy
switch for two reasons. First, the Fed’s unwilling-
ness to take decisive action against inflation had
complicated considerably the conduct of Swiss
monetary policy. In particular, accelerating U.S.
inflation had prompted worried international
investors to sell dollar-denominated assets in
exchange for other currencies such as Swiss
francs. The ensuing sharp drop in the exchange
rate of the U.S. dollar had upset the SNB’s calcu-
lations and had undermined its efforts to achieve
price stability without jeopardizing real growth
of the domestic economy. Second, the SNB hoped
that the Fed’s conversion to monetary discipline
would help to convince other monetary authori-
ties of the need to achieve low inflation. As a
matter of fact, the 1979 policy switch, combined
with similar developments in Europe and other
parts of the world, thoroughly transformed the
global monetary landscape. Most central banks
now regard low inflation as the primordial objec-
tive of monetary policy. The beneficial effect of
this change in attitude has been a dramatic fall
in inflation in most parts of the world. In what
follows, I will examine the international conse-
quences of the Fed’s policy switch in light of
Swiss experience. 
1 On average, it exceeded its previous year’s level by 27.4 percent.
See the appendix for the sources of the data used in this paper. 
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 influence of Karl Brunner and other leading
monetarists, it opted for a policy strategy of
strictly controlling the money supply. The SNB
was convinced that inflation was due largely to
excessive money growth. For this reason, it
decided to stabilize the monetary base at the level
attained at the beginning of 1973. Toward the end
of 1974, it adopted monetary targeting and allowed
the money supply to increase again. At first, it
announced annual growth targets for the money
stock M1 and subsequently for the monetary base. 
Since inflation remained at relatively high
levels until 1975, keeping the monetary base more
or less constant for over a year amounted to a very
restrictive policy indeed. As monetarists would
have predicted, inflation began to abate in due
course and fell to a low of about 1 percent in
1977 and 1978. However, price stability could be
restored only at the cost of a sharp temporary
contraction in real activity, which was magnified
by the negative effects of the first oil price shock
on aggregate demand. 
The fight against inflation, at first, was facili-
tated by a strong appreciation of the Swiss franc,
in both nominal and real terms. Considering the
relatively low Swiss inflation rate, the SNB was
not surprised about the nominal appreciation.
On the contrary, it argued that a nominal appreci-
ation of the Swiss franc was essential to insulate
the domestic economy from foreign inflationary
impulses.2 However, the significant real appreci-
ation of the Swiss franc was puzzling. Initially, it
probably served to correct distortions accumu-
lated during the period of fixed exchange rates,
but as time wore on it increasingly defied econ-
omic fundamentals. While the real appreciation
supported the SNB’s fight against inflation by low-
ering the prices of traded goods, it undermined
the competitive position of domestic industry on
the global market. The SNB reacted to the real
appreciation of the Swiss franc by relaxing suc-
cessively monetary policy, especially in 1977 and
1978. As a result, short-term interest rates dropped
and approached zero toward the end of 1978.
Nevertheless, the real exchange rate continued
to increase unabatedly. 
At the beginning of October 1978, Swiss
authorities decided to abandon monetary targeting
temporarily and to adopt an exchange rate objec-
tive, expressed as a floor on the Swiss franc price
of the Deutsche mark. They were compelled to
take this course of action because of a looming
sharp slump in domestic output.3 The interven-
tions that were required to halt the appreciation
of the Swiss franc caused a massive expansion in
the money supply. Although the SNB switched
back to monetary targeting and to a restrictive
policy course once calm had returned to the for-
eign exchange market, it could not help accepting
another temporary increase in inflation, to over
7 percent in 1981. Thus, contrary to Friedman’s
conjecture, the SNB was unable to insulate the
domestic economy fully from foreign inflationary
shocks.4
SNB officials attributed the disastrous real
appreciation of the Swiss franc to the willingness
of most foreign monetary authorities to tolerate
high inflation. In the SNB’s view, the Fed’s infla-
tionary monetary policy, in particular, served to
destabilize the world economy. It prompted pri-
vate and official international investors to flee
U.S. dollar–denominated assets and to shift their
funds into stable currencies such as the Swiss
franc and the Deutsche mark. If the excessive
real appreciation of the Swiss franc had been
restricted to the U.S. dollar, however, the SNB
would not have been greatly concerned. The really
pernicious aspect of dollar weakness lay in the
fact that the capital flight also caused a substantial
real appreciation of the Swiss franc against the
Deutsche mark, the currency of Switzerland’s
main competitor. For this reason, SNB officials
were grateful and relieved when the Fed in
October 1979 announced its policy shift.5 There
is little doubt that the Fed’s decision to attack
inflation decisively had a salutary effect on the
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2 The SNB was certainly aware of Milton Friedman’s (1953, espe-
cially pp. 180-82) seminal article on the operation of a floating
exchange rate system. 
3 By September 1978, the trade-weighted real exchange rate had
risen by 50.7 percent above its level of January 1973. 
4 See Kugler and Rich (2002) and Rich (2003) for more detailed dis-
cussions of this episode. They also explore the question of whether
the SNB could have avoided the renewed surge in inflation by
following a different policy strategy. 
5 Fritz Leutwiler, president of the SNB at that time, gave several
speeches on these issues (notably Leutwiler, 1978 and 1979). 
 world economy. Coupled with analogous develop-
ments in Europe and other parts of the world,
the U.S. policy shift contributed to convincing
central banks, governments, and the general public
that price stability was essential if an economy
was to generate adequate real growth. Thanks to
the more stable international monetary environ-
ment, central banks, including the SNB, now face
a less vexing task of maintaining price stability
than they did in the turbulent 1970s. 
DOLLAR WEAKNESS AND 
MONETARY POLICY 
TRANSMISSION
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate how the slump in
the external value of the U.S. dollar complicated
the conduct of Swiss monetary policy. When the
SNB adopted monetary targeting, U.S. and Swiss
interest rates were more or less identical. However,
from 1975 onward, both U.S. short-term interest
rates and bond yields rose far above their Swiss
counterparts. Therefore, the differentials for the
three-month interest rates and ten-year govern-
ment bond yields widened considerably. Early in
the 1980s, they reached peaks of about 13 percent-
age points and 8 percentage points, respectively.
As may be seen in Figure 3, Swiss short-term
interest rates declined quickly after 1975. Since
the cyclical contraction in real growth and the
moderation of inflation caused the growth in the
demand for money to slow significantly, the SNB’s
efforts to expand the money supply at a steady
pace in line with its targets pushed down short-
term interest rates. The relaxation of monetary
policy in 1977 and the adoption of a temporary
exchange rate target led to a further drop in short-
term interest rates. In the U.S., by contrast, short-
term interest rates remained stable until 1977 and
subsequently began to rise, with the increase
gathering speed after the policy switch of October
1979 (Figure 4). Even though the interest rate
differentials became wider and wider, the Swiss
franc price of the U.S. dollar continued to fall.
The inverse relationship between the exchange
rate and the interest rate differentials persisted
until the first half of the 1980s, but thereafter it
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Figure 1
Exchange Rate and Short-Term Interest Rate
Differential
SOURCE: Swiss National Bank. Interest rates quoted on the
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Exchange Rate: Swiss Franc/U.S. Dollar (right axis)
10-Year Government Bond Yield Differ ential: 
United States/Switzerland (left  axis , percent )
Figure 2
Exchange Rate and Bond-Yield Differential
SOURCE: Swiss National Bank. Until the end of 1981, the data
refer to the last Monday of each month. If a Monday falls on a
holiday, the data for Tuesday are chosen. Thereafter, the data
refer to the end of the month.
 became positive. This relationship—though not
very close—has remained positive since, with the
exchange rate tending to lag movements in the
interest rate differentials. Consequently, the Fed’s
policy switch altered fundamentally the relation-
ship between the exchange rate and the differen-
tials for short- and long-term interest rates. 
The patterns revealed by Figures 1 and 2 are
consistent with the SNB’s conjecture that in the
1970s a loss of confidence in the Fed caused a
flight from the U.S dollar. Since such a shock is
associated with a decline in demand for dollar-
denominated assets and an increase in demand
for foreign currency–denominated assets, it should
lead to a drop in the exchange rate of the U.S.
dollar, as well as a rise in U.S. and a fall in foreign
interest rates. Thus, the exchange rate should be
negatively correlated with the difference between
U.S. and foreign interest rates. However, after
1979, the Fed restored its credibility, and portfo-
lio shifts induced by lack of confidence gradually
subsided. As a result, the relationship between
the exchange rate and interest rate differentials
turned positive and began to look like the patterns
predicted by standard macroeconomic models. 
The significance of monetary policy credibility
is also borne out by Figures 3 and 4. Suppose that
a central bank raises short-term interest rates in
response to an actual or anticipated increase in
inflation. If the anti-inflationary policy is credible,
the public will expect the increase in short-term
interest rates to be temporary. Therefore, long-term
interest rates will not go up much. However, if
the public is afraid that the future will feature high
and persistent inflation, it will demand signifi-
cantly higher nominal long-term interest rates to
protect itself against losses in the real value of its
assets. For this reason, long-term interest rates
will rise strongly in response to the increase in
short-term rates. The Swiss evidence reveals a
consistently muted reaction of long-term interest
rates to movements in short rates, indicating that
monetary policy credibility was never a major
problem in Switzerland, not even in the 1970s.
In the United States, by contrast, the variance of
short- and long-term interest rates was similar
until the second half of the 1980s, but thereafter
long rates also began to fluctuate less than their
counterparts at the short end. Consequently, a
comparison of movements in short- and long-term
interest rates confirms the earlier conclusion that
the Fed gained credibility after the policy switch
of 1979.6
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Figure 4
U.S. Term Structure of Interest Rates
6 A similar point is made by Goodfriend (2005, p. 247).CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper I show that the inflationary
monetary policy pursued by the Fed up to 1979
exerted destabilizing effects on the rest of the
world. In light of Swiss experience, I conclude
that the slump in the exchange rate of the U.S.
dollar, in particular, complicated considerably
the conduct of domestic monetary policy. Despite
the adoption of a floating exchange rate, the SNB
was unable to insulate the domestic economy
completely from foreign inflationary shocks. Only
after the U.S. monetary policy switch did the
international environment become more con-
ducive to the SNB’s efforts of maintaining price
stability. My paper also suggests that the restora-
tion of the Fed’s credibility impinged on key
macroeconomic relationships such as the link
between the exchange rate and international
interest rate differentials. 
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